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PAROL CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LAND.

History and Comparison.
The terms 'buying and selling land' when strictly applied
relate only to estates in fee.

Accordingly, if a tenant

for life or years transfers his estate in property absolutely,
he is spoken of as having made an assignment, and not a sale
of that interest.

This distinct use of the terms, in speak-

ing of estates in fee and those for a less period, has evidently grown out of the allodial system of tenures adopted
in this country ;

while in England it has probably resulted

from the enactment of the Statute Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. I.
In both countries, then, it will be seen that the term *sale'
has been strictly employed in relation to transfers of estates in fee ; and, though there is apparently little reason
for the partiality, still it application has been thus specifically limited.
By the ancient or fictitious doctrine, which originated
in the usages of feudal times, the tenant of an estate in fee
is claimed to hold his estate as party of the second part in
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a grant executed, and to which the state is party of the first
part.

But, by the terms of this grant, the grantee is not

made liable.to payment, and, as authoritatively admitted,
could not be, either as an express condition of the grant, or
by any collateral agreement, even though the grantor be a
sovereign state.

Hence has arisen the custom of designating

that class of tenants 'land owners', and their agreements to
transfer their rights in the property as buying and selling
land.

There is good reason to believe, however, that had

the feudal system, with the ordinary incidents peculiar to
it, been generally adopted here, the terms 'buying and selling' could not be properly used in speaking of agreements to
transfer land.

An agreement by a tenant to transfer his

land, in that case, would have been known as an agreement to
assign his claim, and not to "sell' it.

The result thus

produced is plainly the product of commerce, and not of the
feudal law.
The change of terminology has, of course, been attended
with some evil results.

The tendency during this renovating

period has been to lose sight of the fundamental features of
real-property law, since those whom we designate as land
owners are in reality only parties of the second part in

grants from the state.

The persons may be the original or

subsequent holders ; that is, they may have it directly from
the state, or as grantees, assignees, or devisees of the
original possessor.

We forget also that the rights of these

parties are merely contract rights of possession ; that
individuals cannot own land as they own personal property,
and that absolute ownership of it is in the state where the
land lies, and can be nowhere else.
The great writers of feudal history have rightly taught
that occupants under the feudal tenure system held claim to
estates in fee, as in those for life or years, to a right of
possession only, and thus conferred by the instrument effecting it. This contract right of possession secured by the
instrument was the only interest the tenant had in the land
which was the subject of the transaction between them.

By the

early feudal law the tenant was not permitted to sell or
assign this contract interest which he had in the property.
It was his to possess for life only, at first ; but later
this restriction was withdrawn to such an extent as would
allow his heirs to succeed to the interest, under a fictitious presumption that they were equal parties with himself
to the lease.

Finally, however, as the tenant's right to

alienate became less and less restricted and he was allowed
to sell or assign his interest, the individual right of
possession grew to appear more like an absolute right in the
property.

But still there were many incidents under the

feudal tenure system which continually reminded the tenant of
the fact that his interest was only leasehold, and of his
relation to the lessor or reversioner.

Further, in changing

from the ancient feudal to the modern allodial system, the
incidents which were before calculated to remind one of the
leasehold character of his tenancy were now so entirely swept
away that the tenant came to be regarded as the absolute
owner of the land, without considering how he became such,
or the impracticability of the position from the very nature
of things.
In place, then, of the definite idea laid down by the
feudal law as to what was the right of the tenant in fee, the
minds of the modern investigators are often left unsatisfied
until this distinction can be seen., To understand the
practicable operations instituted in a sale of land, it is
necessary to have correct ideas as to what interest an individual can have or hold that he may sell, and what constitutes
the title which is to be sold.

In an estate in fee the tenant

has precisely the same sort of interest which he may sell as
the owner of a less estate, it differing only in what is
called the quantity of the estate, so that he agrees to sell
and perfect the title in the same manner.

The form of the

agreement and the ultimate expression may or may not be different, but the operation and effect will be practically the
same.,

According then to the established idea of property

right, this tenant, as party of the second part to a grant
from the state, voluntarily agrees to sell and assign his
grant or contract right in the premises.

This must be the

subject of the transaction, as he has nothing else which he
may sell, except his contract right to possess and enjoy the
land to the exclusion of all others.

But as the contract

right is not attended with obligations of rent or service on
the part of the tenant, or ceremony of fealty in token of
his dependence, in such grant from the state, its authority
is not mentioned or recognized as a necessary part of the
agreement to convey.

The original owner then sells the

land, as though he had the absolute property independent of
all grants or contracts, and the grant of the state, so far
as his subsequent grantees, &c., are concerned in later
conveyances made by them, is left out of sight, and usually
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unknown or thought of by them.

It will therefore be seen that

by this method of operating all circumlocution is avoided,
and the result thus obtained is the same, to the extent of the
land described, as though the grant of the state was specifically recited in the instrument.
These fictitious grants of the state are, as a matter of
course, divided among the different owners according to the
area of the land described, each being a party of the second
part to the extent of the land which he has acquired.

But as

no rents or profits are or can be reserved by the state as a
condition

of this holding, no circumstances are presented

which tend to remind the parties that any such thing as tenure
exists and forms the foundation for the title they claim under.
The laws regulating the negotiations between the parties
to these transactions and their relation to each other is
known as the law of vendor and vendee.

The popular significa-

tion of the terms 'sale of land" seems to be generally limited
to transfers of estates in fee, but this does not affect the
legal view of the subject to which they properly apply, and
which must necessarily be otherwise.

It may be accepted,

then, that the terms "sale of land' embraced two distinct
points for consideration, viz. ; the land which is the sub-

ject of the conveyance, and the contract which establishes a
right in the property.

Mutua

AgYreement.

It is evident at the first sight that every voluntary
alienation of land or an agreement therein must necessarily
be preceded by an agreement of such extent as will completely
effectuate the intention of the parties.

If this mutual

purpose is to be immediately carried out or executed, no
particular legal form is required that the intended result
may be acquired.

But when any time is to intervene between

the making and the complete fulfilment of the agreement, it
is necessary that it be put in particular legal form in order
that it may be effective and binding upon the parties thereto.

Executory and Executed Contracts.
A distinction is this line is usually quite evident and
derterminable, so much so, that there may be easily said, and
perhaps uselessly,that no conflicts exist in the decisions.
The question which should here receive some attention is,
whether an executed contract can be considered a contract at

all.

The point first received serious attention in the case

of Fletcher v. Peck, (6 Cranch,) which arose from an act of
the Georgia Legislature, which had attempted to avoid a
grant of land made by it to a citizen of that State.

This

claim of right was contended by the grantee, on the ground
that the act was contrary to the provision of the Constitution
which forbade the States to enact laws impairing the obligations of contracts.

The judgment in this case, which was

probably one of the most important rendered in the early
history of the Supreme Court, so firmly and satisfactorily
decided that the act was within the legislation prohibited by
the Constitution, that the position taken has ever since been
received as the correct one and without

question.

In returning to the objective point under this head for
the purpose of considering a method of distinguishing executory from executed contracts, it will be seen that a satisfactory result may be best drawn out by asking the question :
Has the contracting party the same title or interest in the
property which he had before making the contract ?

If the

question is answered in the affirmative, the contract is
executory ;

if in the negative, it is executed.

The question

might also be, as to whether the party into whose possession
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the land was to go had acquired other and greater interest in
it than he previously held ; and if so asked, is entitled to
a result analogous to that in the previous question.

In

examining these questions, however, the transfers of interest
must be strictly limited to legal interests, as they in no
way apply to those of an equitable nature.
After the above division of the main subject into
executory and executed contracts, each of these are again
subdivided into two great classes : executory, into those
which by reason of some informality or irregularity (which
is a condition precedent) cannot be treated otherwise, and
those which must be so treated in order to carry out the
intention of the parties ; and executed, where one or the
other of the parties has fully performed his part, and the
so-called leaseholds or estates are less than a freehold.
The latter estate, however, as regards the lessor and lessee,
is rather executory, but as to all other persons the lessee
has a vested right and estate in the property.

This may also

be strengthened by the view under the modern system, since
here the above distinction is not made, and all persons claiming as lessees from the state or subsequent holders hold a
vested right in the property,.

Common Law Rule.
Since the vote of Parliament adopting the Statute of
Frauds, in the reign of Charles II, was almost a contemporary
of the legislation allowing the tenant of an estate in fee to
dispose of his property, there are very few cases reported,
either of great or little importance, which examined and
propounded the law on this subject as it existed just prior to
the enactment of the now famous statute.
Immediately following the enactment of the Statute of
Frauds in England in 1676, the purpose of which, as laid
down in its preamble, was to prevent the many fradulent
practices in respect to land contracts, which were generally
furthered by perjury and subordination thereof, most of the
then colonies, but later members of the United States, first ac
cepted and established this English idea almost literallyi
The modern statutes on this subject, or the revisions of the
original in the different States, have substantially the
effect of its predecessor, out as experience has taught, and
the requirements of life presented the various difficulties
of the situation, most of these States have modified and
varied its provisions to meet the apparent requirements.
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The substance and main feature of the statute was to require
a writing of the facts connected with an agreement for the
transfer of land, as the only sufficient evidence of contract
relations existing, and the only evidence which could

--

with

one exception -- secure the injured party the aid of a court
of justice in a suit for specific performance.
Some fe; of the early States, mong them Pennsylvania,
adopted only part of the English statute, excluding that in
relation to land contracts ; and the courts of that State
held, in the precedent established in Ewing v. Tees-, (1 Binney -- Pa.) that the rules of common law were alone applicable, and the 4th section of the English statute was unrecognized and of no effect.

Under the common law rules, however,

the purchaser could always recover money or legal damages,
where he had paid something in execution of his part of the
contract.

But in many cases this relief was entirely inade-

quate in balancing the injury sustained by the active and
abiding party, and as a vested right was necessary to the
securing of equitable relief, the court having jurisdiction
of this matter could only be brought to bear where the grantee
had been put in possession under the contract and thereupon
performed acts of such a permanent and personal character that
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it must work a direct and inequitable fraud upon the party in
possession if the promisor were allowed to reject and
cancel the contract at his own option.

So, therefore, as

the court of equity had deemed it its duty to co-operate to
prevent this fradulent injury before the enactment of the
statute, much more could it be deemed justified in allowing
the honest work of the possessor to stand as sufficient
evidence of the actual contract relations existing after its
passage.

By so doing, it would also prevent the use of the

statute which would otherwise further the fradulent actions.
But in all these cases it must be remembered that possession
under the contract must be open and with the consent or
acquiescence of the vendor.
This particular relief or remedy is given in respect to
contracts for realty as distinguished from personalty, in
that this class of property is quite

liable to have peculiar

or special value, which the purchaser alone recognizes, and
which cannot be duplicated, or other facts affecting value
which a jury would not and could not account for in giving
damages.

It is therefore evident that under no circumstances

will a court decree specific performance where a payment of
money is the only act of part performance, as in this case a

court of law can always give adequate relief.

Written Evidence Required,.
The Statute of Frauds, in its application to contracts
for the transfer of interests in land, embodies as its only
and great feature the requirement that such contracts must be
evidenced by a writing and shall be signed by the party, or
his agent lawfully authorized by a writing.

This writing,

more explicitedly considered, must contain all the main facts
on which the contract is based or operates.

It need not,

however, be in the form of a theme, but may as well be in the
shape of an account when such plan fairly expresses the agreement.

The requirement before mentioned is not, as may be at

first supposed, such as to regulate the fact of what is or
shall hereafter be considered a contract ;

but states that

those same relations, when subsequently created between
parties, shall not have legal force and effect unless the
positions of the parties to the contract can be shown and
proved by a writing drawn at its creation and signed by the
party to be charged, or his attorney authorized by a writing.
The purpose of this statute, as its wording plainly

expounds, was to protect the parties from mis-statements,
whether intentional, or innocently made as the result of
forgetfulness, and from false testimony of witnesses brought
in to prove the terms of the contract.

It seems that at the

time of the adoption of this statute in England the alienation of land had become quite general, and as agreement, and
that by parol, was alone customary, they became the subject
of continuous litigation, implanted with perjury.

What Constitutes an Interest in Land.
This question is one which has been often before the
courts of both England and the several States of this country,
and though the decisions on this point are not entirely in
harmony, still, as the conflict is more apparent than real,
it is not of sufficient importance to require special attention.

The principal questions to be here investigated are

in respect to the two subjects, License and Grant.
A license, to be well defined, is a privilege to act in
respect to the land of another in such a way as not to affect
the title of the owner, yet to give the licensee such
immunities as will excuse him from liability in an action

of trespass.

A license gives the privilege and time for

doing an express act, but if not, must allow a reasonable
time, so that the licensee may not suffer injury thereby.
The distinction between grant and license, then, is that
the second party to the contract for license gets merely an
excuse for trespass, which cannot have legal and binding
force until completed, and which may be revoked by the party
of the first part at any time without the consent of the
licensee, except where a reasonable or definite period was
agreed upon, and revocation before the end of this period
might work great injury upon the licensee.

But as to the

latter class, in respect to a definite period, this regulation cannot be said unhesitatingly to apply, since there is
then but an apparent difference between it and a grant, and
upon which the decisions of the courts can hardly be spoken
of as harmonious.

Grants give either a right of possession

or an incorporeal right, while licenses give neither.

They

also require consideration to make them effective, if executory, but this is not at all an essential to the creation of
a license.
The true method, however, to determine the existing
relation is that comnonly employed in expounding all con-

tracts.

In doing this, the question to be asked is : What

have they expressed, and how have they expressed their intentions ?

If it be only a license, it may be created by

parol and without consideration, as it is under all circumstances independent of the Statute of Frauds.

Licenses Divided.
Licenses have been divided in four classes, viz. :
(1) Those which cannot have other effect, being parol
(2) those which must so operate because of the character of
the interest involved ; (3) those in which it is their
express intention ; and (4) those in which it is the implied
intention of the parties.
Those transactions which could only operate as licenses
by reason of informality, necessarily take this position from
the wording of the statute, which requires written evidence
to effect, and without which the courts could only give it
the force and effect of a license.

The distinction, then,

is not in respect to the character of the land under consideration, but only the manner in which the interest was claimed.
In other words, the status depended on whether the contract

was in writing so as to create a grant, or only by parol so
as to operate as a license.

As to the class dependent upon

the species of interest involved, there has been little
conflict in the decisions.

This division does not base its

reason for distinction upon the intention of the parties, but,
like the previous one, upon a less prominent point.

The

character of the interest which must be considered in determining between the parties in order to place them under the
right head is of different kinds ; the one which may readily
come within the term "license' is restricted to those claims
in which neither the land, an interest therein, nor its
occupation is the subject of the agreement, but is really
only a collateral thereto.

For example, an agreement to go

upon the land of another for the purpose of plowing, etc.
The agreement though destroying the effect of a suit for
trespass, also allows the party to go upon the land for the
particular purpose, but does not in any way give such an
interest as is regulated by the Statute of Frauds.

This

permission to enter and act in regard to lands of another
without acquiring any interest therein, is only a license,
and this is so whether the agreement had been oral or reduced
to writing.

These licenses may also be implied from the
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apparent holding out of the premises for public use, but may
as well be upon similar agreement for consideration, as otherwise, and must be dependent upon the custom of those previously occupying it. The latter method of holding or occupying
property may be such as would at first have given a cause of
action in trespass, but may finally transform itself into an
absolute right and title, if there be an open and adverse
possession for a sufficient period to satisfy the Statute of
Limitations.

licenses Distinguished from Grants.
A license is a mere personal privilege or excuse from
doing an act with relation to the real estate of another which
if unauthorized would give the licensor or owner a cause of
action against the licensee in trespass.

And having also

the quality of personality, the claim which the licensee holds
in the property can in no way be effective if transferred, so
that by no method, whether by assignment or gift, can the
transferee get any claim to privileges which might previously
have been enjoyed by his grantee.

The claim differs from a

grant, as before mentioned, in that no consideration is

necessary to make it effective, and the mutual obligation
which is always found in cases of grant is not a necessary
factor in the creation of a license.

This relation between

the parties is often established, as we shall see hereafter,
where the circumstances are such that though the parties may
have intended a grant to result, the law gives it only the
effect of a license.
This distinction, though quite apparent, seems to have
been somewhat overlooked by the earlier decisions, thereby
causing, as must be expected, an almost indiscriminate use of
the words "grant' and "license.'

The view thus taken neces-

sarily produced a proportionate effect upon the certainty
with which they applied the statute to various cases as they
arose.

It might here be effectual then, if attention be

drawn to the fact that the statute applies only to those
cases where the parties intended to transfer an absolute and
transferable right in the property ; that is, such a right
as would necessarily restrict the powers of the owner and
increase those of the grantee in the particular property.
The title of the licensor, however, is not diminished or
the licensee's increasedland as the privilege to act may be
revoked at any time at the option of the owner, the claim of

the licensee can only be effectual where the act has been
completed.

Licenses Revocable.
The expenditure of money does not as a general thing
make a license in respect to which the payment was made
irrevocable ; except, perhaps, where the privilege was
impliedly limited to a particular period of time.

In the

latter case the extent of time allowed is usually what would
be presumed to be a fair and reasonable period in which to
carry out the work the licensee had in view, and that upon
which the owner had figured in allowing it, in order that his
on rights might be protected.
Next, it should also be noted that there has been a
noticeable lack of harmony in the decisions upon the point of
giving the effect of licenses to particular arrangements for
the use of another's land for an express period and upon
consideration, without it being effected, as the ordinary
agreements for an interest in land, by the requirements of
the Statute of Frauds.

By this unsatisfactory state of

things, parties may or may not come within the statute, as

the particular court may decide.
To revoke a license, it is always necessary that the
licensee should have notice of the owner's intention to withdraw the privilege under which he has been acting.

The

revocation, though in no way affecting the lawfulness of the
previous operations, will subsequently have the effect of
making any act of the person in cerogation of the owner's
right a trespass, and subject him to liability therefor.w
The notice above mentioned need not of necessity be formal
or particularly expressed, but is sufficient if it in any way
shows an intention to revoke.

For example, we may take the

case of a pretending purchaser, who takes possession of the
property under an agreement to pay for the premises by instalments which are to become due at definitely appointed times.
Here the license under which possession is given would be
revoked immediately after default of the licensee in making
the first payment as agreed upon, whether the default be
openly made by refusal after demand, or simply by the noncompliance.

So a conveyance of property in which a license

is claimed will be sufficient notice to the licensee to quit
the premises, without further formalitiesi

License Coupled with Interest.
These licenses are really a combination of two licenses,
each of which have at the same time separate and joint duties
to perform.

It exists, for example, in such cases as where

a person is licensed to enter and erect buildings on the land
of another, with a necessarily accompanying license (usually
implied) b-, which he is privileged to remove the building
when the license allowing the use of the land upon which it
is standing is revoked.

This condition though somewhat con-

trary to the general rule which requires a defeasible arrangement, is still so equitably within the rule that it should be
given the effect of a license, so as to allow an entrance for
the purpose of removing the building.

It may also be seen

that where the particular acts to be performed under a license
have been partly performed by the licensee upon the faith of
the agreement, it may become a contract in equity which will
have the effect of preventing a revocation by the owner at
such an unexpected time as to work great injury upon the
licensee.

It might be effected by an estoppel in pals on the

ground of statements and actions on the part of the owner,
which if effectual would not prevent what damages might not

adequately remedy.
It should be kept in mind, however, that in all cases
where particular circumstances do not exist, a license is
revocable at any time at the will of the owner.

The revoca-

tion of a license must always result from a conveyance of
the property or an interest therein, if in any way antagonistic to the claim of the licensee.

Interests within the Statute of Frauds.
This branch of the law necessarily involves the question
as to what is and what is not a part of the land.

Under this

head, vegetable products are the chief source of litigation
and although the opinions upon the point ably consider the
question, the law upon it is quite unsettled and subject to
variation.

These vegetable products are divided into two

classes : those which are produced yearly, after being once
planted, without further attention or cultivation ; and those
which depend upon special yearly planting to bring them into
existence.

The first class, (products naturales) are usually

termed perennials, since in these all outward signs of life
disappear annually, while the root and stem survive for years,

during each of which it produces its crops of leaves, &c.
The second class (products industriales) as before said, include only those which perish annually, and usually result
from special yearly plantings.,
As regards the legal side of the subject, the main
difference in the legal status of the two classes is that the
second class (which results only from special planting and
cultivation) is always subject to execution and sale as
chattels or personal property.

The probable origin of this

distinction is that recognized in an early New York Report,
which notes the fact that formerly (that is, during feudal
and early Common Law times) the crops raised were generally
the property of tenants, while the land upon which they were
raised belonged to another -- the lord.

Products of the Soil.
It is quite evident by what reasoning this class of
productions might be brought within the range of the Statute
of Frauds.

Here the person planting a crop must have the

use of the land during its growth, and also the incident which
would allow him to enter and remove the crop when it had

fully matured.
A distinction should here be noticed, as laid down in
several decisions, that the interest which is within the
Statute of Frauds only exists as long as the plant is growing ;

and when it can be said to have fairly matured or

ripened, it no longer constitutes an interest in land within
the Statute, but is rather mere personal property, entirely
independent of the land in which they were grown.

This rule

was lai. down in an early English case, in a suit to determine
the status of a crop of potatoes which had matured.

The

decision was to the effect that the potatoes, though still
in the ground, were no more a part of the land than if they
had just been placed in a box or other vessel and that put in
the ground, upon the reasoning that as soon as they had
matured, the connection and the reason therefor immediately
ceased, so that after that time their position was merely one
of protection or shelter.

Although the decisions on this

subject are not as harmonious as might be wished, still these
questions may often be settled by looking at the apparent
intent of the parties, so that occasionally where it appears
as though an interest in land is to pass, it must always
operate to the contrary if that is the intention of the

parties.

By looking at them in this light it will be seen,

as held in various decisions, that growing crops may or may
not be the subject of a conveyance.

Exception to General Rule.
These cases necessarily treat of the status of crops
under various conditions and circumstances.

In examining

these, we would probably ask the question, whether a contract
for crops must necessarily include an interest in land within
the meaning of the Statute.

This question, however, can only

be answered by looking at the character and special provisions
of the agreement under consideration.
An example of this condition of things may be found in
those cases where growing objects or crops are the subject
of the contract, and in which there is an express or implied
condition as to time of transfer, which must be in futurity.
If the subject of the agreement is fruit, the time of transfer
will be maturity ;

but in the case of growing trees, only

after the performance of some act of the vendor which is
necessary to change its legal status so that it may be unaffected by the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

The first part of the subject has been satisfactorily
settled, and the general holding is to the effect that so
long as the object or subject of the contract is separated
from the soil, on the faith of the contract, title will
immediately vest in the vendee the same as though for any
personal property.

But if the subject of the contract is

not severed and changed as agreed by the parties, so that it
may take the form of personalty, no interest is acquired in
the property under the parol agreement, and no satisfaction
can be had except by way of damages.

The best method of

viewing this, however, seems to be (if for standing timber),
that the agreement in no way effects an interest in land, but
that by it the vendor agrees for part of a lump sum that he
will separate the property as contemplated by the agreement,
and will then, for the balance, actually transfer the property
which is the subject of the negotiations, the same as
ordinary personalty:-

Particular and Limited Interests.
These interests include all claims incident to title in
land which take the quality of permanency in the shape of
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structures erected thereon, together with any fixtures vhich
may have been permanently annexed to it. All this, though
not a part of the soil naturally, thus becomes of the realty,
and an agreement to convey it cannot be enforced unless the
written requirement of the statute is produced.

To this,

however, special exception has been made in the case of a
sale of the structure, accompanied by a license to remove it
from the premises.

Here it will be seen that the licensee

has an interest coupled with his privilege to remove, so that
his right to remove cannot be affected by revocation or the
Statute of Frauds,.
It has also been decided that a writing is necessary in
order to enforce a contract for possession of property, on
the ground that it was for an interest in land within the
meaning of the Statute which requires such evidence.

This

rile may also be extended to cover all agreements for exchange
or release between parties.

Mineral Products.
Under the present condition of the law, especially in
the United States, it would appear almost unreasonable to
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treat these as anything but what is now designated 'land" or
a part thereof, as recited in the only common definition of it.
But under early English law, they were not treated as part
of the property of the person ovming the surface, but were
held as the exclusive property of the Crown.

During the

early period of valuable mineral discoveries in America and
the allotment of Government land to settlers, some recognition of Government right was visible, but it was almost
immediately released, upon the adoption of the present
allodial system.

This system recognizes in a grantee absolute

claim to all property within his boundary, whether it be
above or below the surface of the land ;

and it seems to be

the only fair and liberal rule which could be adopted.
According to this, then, everything is part of the land which
is permanently attached, and any agreement to transfer title
to it must necessarily be evidenced by the writing which the
Statute of Frauds requires.

Part Performance .
Having now reached the pivotal point, our attention
should be drawn to the interesting question in which the

course of reasoning in acquiring a satisfactory result is
often misunderstood by examiners.

The point is, whether the

law regards the part performance of a parol contract for
land an equivalent and substitute for the written memoranda
required by the Statute of Frauds.

In answer to this, we may

say that the Statute makes no exception to the general requirement, and the law does not recognize it as supplying the
deficiency and giving it the same validity as a contract in
writing.

It is often stated that certain acts of part per-

formance take parol contracts out of the Statute, or make
the writing unnecessary, but if the cases upon this are
closely examined it will be seen that the apparent is not the
real meaning of the words used, and that the effect given in
no way depends upon the legality of the contract.

The excep-

tional effect which is given is only in a court of equity,
and under the same circumstances as its power was invoked
before the passage of the Statute.

It did not act by reason

of any provision contained in the contract, but only as
before the Statute, and which would nov, if not avoided in
equity, aid and protect the very fault which its enactment
was to prevent.

The specific ground for its action was to

enforce an estoppel which had been raised under fraudulent
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statements of the vendor, for which legal damages were entirely inadequate and which equity alone could sufficiently
remedy.

Before the enactment of the Statute (as above men-

tioned), the court of equity had often deemed it its duty to
prevent immeasurable damages through fraud, so that subsequently, since not specially restricted, it was deemed a
further duty to carry out its real purposes, though it might
at the same time be disregarding the literal and apparent
requirements,.

The equity courts then only interfered, as

before the Statute, when the vendee had acted upon the agreement, changed his position upon the faith of it, and in
general so acted that if the vendor was allowed to cancel it
and take his former place he would derive great advantages,
while the vendee would suffer inestimable loss and injury
from the fraud practiced upon him,
A sufficient part performance, to secure equitable aid
in avoiding the literal requirements of the Statute, must
always be such as will give satisfactory evidence of the facts
upon which the acts are based, and at the same time place the
vendee in such a position that money damages cannot replace
him., The first essential is that the vendee must have been
put or let into possession without dissent.

But the pos-

session must have been taken or announced by a special and
independent act, since the holding over by a tenant is not a
sufficiently open evidence of the exact contract relations to
allow equitable cognizance.

Neither is a part or full pay-

ment of the purchase price admitted to be sufficient part
performance.

So, it must appear upon summarizing these facts,

that parol contracts for the sale of land or an interest
therein can only be effective in carrying out the agreement
when (as before the great work of Nottingham) inestimable
injury would result which the court of equity alone could
and would remedyw

